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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

I

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
Case No. 12496

vs.
HAROLD F. HEEMER,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second District Court for Weber County
The Honorable John Wahlquist

JAMES W. FREED
Attorney at Law
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for DefendantAppellant, Heemer
VERNON ROMNEY
Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent, State of Utah
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
AND DISPOSITION OF CASE BELOW

Appellant, Harold F. Reemer, is
appealing from a conviction of embezzlement of a motor vehicle, pursuant to
which Appellant was sentenced to a term
of not less than one (1) year nor more
than ten (10) years in the State
Penitentiary.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks an order remanding the case for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

On or about February 21, 1970,
Appellant rented an automobile from

Astro-Trans, Inc. of Ogden, Utah,
which rental, according to the terms
of the written agreement, was to
terminate on Febru0ry 28,
(State's Exhibit "A").

1970

The entire

case against Appellant was based upon
the testimony of a Mr. Corky Sweet,
the manager of Astro-Trans, Inc. at
the time of the above rental.

At

least two oral extensions of the rental were given to Appellant by Mr.
Sweet (R. 91, 92).

It is Appellant's

contention that the record is unclear
as to when the automobile was to be
returned.

At one point, Mr. Sweet

testified the automobile was to be
returned during the first or second
week of April, 1970 (R. 92).

But, he

also testified that "there was never
any definite return date established"
(R. 105, lns.

21-23).

-
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Mr. Sweet notified the police on
July 10, 1970 (R. 95).

The automobile

was located by agents of Astra-Trans,
Inc. in Casper, Wyoming on August 28
or 29, 1970, and returned to that
company (R. 99) .

Appellant was

arrested in Casper, Wyoming on November 5, 1970.
At the same time after the arrest,
counsel was appointed to represent
Appellant.

The counsel appointed was

Mr. John Blair Hutchison of Ogden,
Utah.

Exactly when he was appointed

is unclear from the record.

The order

appointing counsel is dated March 9,
1971, but that is after the trial and
Mr. Hutchison did represent Appellant
at his arraignment on December 14, ·
1970.

The case was tried on February

16, 1971, but Appellant was not rep-

-
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resented by Mr. Hutchison at the trial.
One day before the trial, Appellant
was

for approximately

thirty (30) minutes by a Mr. James

z.

Davis, who then represented Appellant
during the course of the trial.

ARGUMENT
I.
CHANGE OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
THE DAY BEFORE TRIAL CONSTITUTED A
VIOL.\TION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AS CiJARANTEED BY THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION TWELVE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
It has long been held that the
assignment of counsel in a st<· te prosecution at such time and under such
circumstances as to preclude the
giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of a case constitutes
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a denial of due process of law.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (193/).
Although counsel wus assigned to Appellant in sufficient time in the instant
case,

it was not that counsel who rep-

resented Appellant at trial.

Surely,

among the most significant factors in
determining whether an accused has received the effective aid of counsel are
the time and ability of counsel to adequately prepare for trial and consultation with the accused.

"A person

accused of crime has the right to communicate and consult freely with his
attorney prior to trial. .. "

21 Am.

Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, Section 312.
In an annotation on communication with
the client as an element of the right
to counsel,

it is said:

"An accused has the right
to consult with his attorney,

-
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not only on the day of his
trial, but also before this
date, so as to enable the
counsel to prepare adequately
for the defense, and courts
generally enforce this right ... "
5 A.L.R. 3d 1360, 1385, Anno.,
Right to Counsel-Communication.
In House v.

324 U.S. 42 (1944),

the court stated that a denial of due
process had occurred where "petitioner
had his own attorney and was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with him".

In the instant case,

Appellant had his own counsel, appointed
for him by the court.

Suddenly, on the

day before the trial, the most critical
stage of the proceedings, a new lc-·wyer
appears.

That new lawyer consulted with

Appellant for no more than thirty (30)
minutes and that is the only consultation Appellant was afforded with the
counsel who was to try the case.
Client consultation is one of the most

- 6 -

crucial of the elements of preparation
of a defense.

Counsel must know his

client, the kind of contribution that
the client can make to his own defense,
all sides of the client's view of the
facts to be presented, the kind of
witness the client will be and his appearance to the jury.

It is submitted

that a thirty (30) minute conference,
one day prior to trial, by a defense
lawyer who has never befrre met the
accused,

is not sufficient for adequate

representation and effective legal aid.
In addition to the effective denial of Appellant's right to consult
with counsel,

substitution of counsel

the day prior to trial, deprived Appellant of his right to have his lawyer
adequately prepared to defend the case.
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"A reasonable time for preparation of the defendant's case
must be allowed bC?tween the time
of assignment of counsel and the
date of the trial. And to the
extent that adequate time is not
allowed for this purpose, the
defendant is held to be deprived
of his rights without due process
of law."
21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal
Law, Section 320.
Although it is true that neither police
officials nor the lower court did anything to prevent adequate defense preparation, the substitution of counsel
effectively denied Appellant his right
to that preparation.

It cannot be said

that one day prior to a trial, where
years of a man°s life are at stake, is
time for adequate preparation for that
trial.

Considerably more time is

necessary for counsel to consult
with the accused, to test the veracity
of the accused and to determine the
proper course for presentation of a
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defense to a jury.

Substitution of

counsel so short a time before trial
sLould be held to constitute a denial
of the right to effective and adequate
representation of counsel.
Appellant cannot be said to have
waived his right to counsel by allowing the trial to proceed.

Any waiver

of that right "in order to be valid,
must be given voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently, and the accused
must be sufficiently forewarned as to
his rights."

18 L. Ed. 2d 1420,

1421-22, Anno., Right to Counsel.
no time was Appellant forewarned of
any aspects of his right to counsel
nor

he offered a continuance to

allow him to consult with his new
attorney.
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At

II.
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY
Appellant was accused and convicted
of the crime of embezzlement; more particularly, of a violation of Section
76-17-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, which provides,

in its here

pertinent part:
"Every person who has leased
or rented a motor vehicle ...
and who wilfully fails to return
the same to its owner within ten
days after the lease or rental
agreement has expired is guilty
of embezzlement."
This Court,

in interpreting that stat-

ute, has defined the term "wilfully"
as a "purpose or willingness to commit
the act or make the omission referred
to".

State v. Knepper, 18 Utah 2d _215,

418 P.2d 780, 781 (1966).
In order for there to be a wilful failure to return

a
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motor vehicle,

there must be a definite fixed time
for expiration of the agreement of
which the accused is aware and which
he willingly exceeds.

As is apparent

from the transcript of the trial, the
entire case against Appellant is based
upon the testimony of a single witness,
Mr. Corky Sweet.

Appellant contends

that Mr. Sweet's own testimony is so
inconsistent with respect to when the
rental agreement was to expire as to
be totally

to support a

verdict of guilty.
The original written rental agreement was for a period of one week
(State's Exhibit "A").

Near the end

of that term, Appellant telephoned Mr.
Sweet and requested an extension of
the term.

Mr. Sweet granted that re-

quest, but could not remember for how

-
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long an extension (R. 91) .

Appellant

later went to Mr. Sweet in person and
requested another extension of the
term.

That extension was also granted

(R. 92).

Subsequently, Appellant tele-

phoned Mr. Sweet at least twice to inform him that Appellant was delayed in
returning the automobile, but that it
would be

(R. 93).

There is

no testimony or other evidence of what
Mr. Sweet told Appellant during those
telephone calls.
It is at this point that a serious conflict in Mr. Sweetus testimony
He did testify that the rental was to terminate in the first or
second week of April, 1970 (R. 92) and
that no further extensions were given
(R. 95).

However, he also testified

that no definite time was set for return
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of the car.

Concerning Appellant's

first request for an extension of time,
the following dialogue took place between Mr. Sweet and defense counsel:

Q.
Now, was there any date
set upon which he would have to
return the car, did you set any
date at all?
A.

Q.
term?

No.
It was an open-ended

A. Right.
The conversation
might have been, go ahead and
keep it another week. Give me
a holler, something like that.

Q. But it could have been
another month or two months?
A.

Sure, definitely.

(R. 103, lns. 8-16)
Mr. Sweet also testified that it was
possible that no definite time was set
for return of the car (R. 104) .
It seems clear from the above
testimony and a reading of the entire
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record that Mr. Sweet,

the single wit-

ness against Appellant, was not sure
in his own mind when the car was to be
returned or the rental to expire.

How

then can Appellant be said to have
known when the rental was to expire
and to have wilfully failed to meet
that date?

Appellant contends that a

person cannot wilfully fail to meet
some unknown or uncertain due date.
This is not a case of a conflict in
the testimony of two different witnesses, one of whom t •e jury might not
believe.

Rather, this is a case of a

conflict in the testimony of the single
witness upon whose testimony the
State's entire case is based.

It is

submitted that a verdict of guilty
and a prison sentence cannot be based
upon such a conflict.
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CONCLUSION

Appellant is entitled to have his
conviction vacated and the case remanded
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

James W. Freed
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
Harold F. Reemer
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